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INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing Great Recession has triggered numerous proposals 
to improve the regulation of financial markets and, most importantly, 
the regulation of organizations such as credit rating agencies, under-
writers, hedge funds, and banks, whose behavior is believed to have 
caused the credit crisis that spawned the economic collapse.1  Not sur-
prisingly, some of the reform efforts seek to strengthen the use of pri-
vate litigation.2  Private suits have long been championed as a necessary 
mechanism not only to compensate investors for harms they suffer 
from financial frauds but also to enhance deterrence of wrongdoing.3  
1 Congress has recently sought to address the economic crisis with proposed legis-
lation aimed at greater oversight of these organizations.  See, e.g., Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2010); Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009); Private Fund In-
vestment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009); Investor 
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009); Comprehensive Derivatives 
Regulation Act of 2009, S. 1691, 111th Cong. (2009). 
2 See, e.g., Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 
1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing to amend section 20 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to authorize private actions against persons who “knowingly or 
recklessly provide[] substantial assistance to another person in violation of [the Act]”); 
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th Cong. § 984 (Discussion 
Draft 2009), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AYO09D44_xml.pdf 
(proposing to amend section 21D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to authorize 
private liability for aiding and abetting in violation of the Act).  
3 The most significant embrace of the deterrent value of private suits is the Su-
preme Court’s recognition of implied private rights of action under the securities laws.  
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that the 
existence of an implied private right of action under the antifraud provisions of the 
1933 and 1934 Acts “is simply beyond peradventure”); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supple-
ment to Commission action.  As in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of 
civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement 
of the proxy requirements.”), abrogated by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 276 
(2001).  For emphatic and thoughtful defenses of the private suit, see generally James 
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However, in recent years there has been a chorus calling for reform, 
singing a distinctly deregulatory tune and calling for serious restraints on 
private litigation as a vehicle for protecting investors.4  In this revisionist 
story, securities class action suits were cast as the villain that placed U.S. 
capital markets at a serious competitive disadvantage without producing 
any net benefits for institutional investors, whose trading makes them 
not only dominant participants in securities markets but also important 
beneficiaries of successful securities class action settlements.5 
It is interesting to note, though, how quickly a crisis can change 
the discourse of public debate on the value of private litigation.  Now it 
seems likely that reform will occur.  While we are hopeful that the re-
cession will ultimately abate, a significant question nonetheless remains:  
which of these two views of securities class actions should guide the 
formation of public policy with respect to the role of private litigation in 
the greater constellation of financial market regulatory mechanisms?  
In this Article, we provide evidence addressing this very issue. 
D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997), and 
Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994). 
4 See COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com (follow hyperlink under “March 2007” 
heading) (“[T]he perception . . . of burdensome and duplicative regulatory schemes 
and an inefficient and unfair legal system w[as] making the U.S. capital markets in-
creasingly less attractive .  .  .  .”); MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, 
SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 16 
(2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (observing 
that the highly regulated U.S. legal environment in the financial sector is perceived as 
“less fair and less predictable”); see also U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURI-
TIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:  THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM i-
iv (2008) (asserting that securities class action costs are “enormous,” provide “minis-
cule” benefits, and erode the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets).  Academics also 
have repeatedly doubted that the benefits of private securities suits outweigh their costs 
to the defendant firm as well as society.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 727, 747 (1995) (concluding that it is unclear whether the securities liti-
gation process does more good than harm); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Liti-
gation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 65-66 (1991) (noting that stock price 
changes of companies involved in securities class actions do not support the proposition 
that the suits confer substantial wealth effects on the company’s stockholders).   
5 See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2089-91 (1995) (reporting that a small number of large institutional investors 
submit a significant portion of the claims in settled securities class actions).  
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I.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS 
The costs and benefits of securities class actions for the past two 
decades have been central to the formulation of policy regarding pri-
vate suits.  The extensive hearing record compiled before Congress’s 
enactment of the monumental Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA)6 was filled with empirical data purporting to cap-
ture the effects of securities class actions.7  Since the PSLRA’s enact-
ment, there have been scores of empirical studies exploring different 
aspects of securities class actions and the impact of the PSLRA on the 
conduct and outcome of these suits.  Much like how the Pentagon 
once purported to measure progress in the Vietnam War by compara-
tive body counts, so has much of the securities litigation literature 
sought to evaluate the value of securities class actions, and in turn the 
PSLRA, by capturing data bearing on dismissal rates and settlement 
amounts (pre- and post-PSLRA), the outcomes associated with differ-
ent types of suits and lead plaintiffs, and even the variation of attor-
neys’ fees across categories of suits.  Since we have produced some of 
this literature, it is in our self-interest to say these are important inqui-
6 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
7 See generally Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws:  Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (examining the efficacy of securities class action 
litigation); Securities Litigation Reform:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications 
and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (discussing the 
effects of regulations and laws on deterrence of securities fraud).  For example, the 
SEC’s Division of Enforcement Director marshaled data from the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts showing the ebbs and flows in the number of class actions 
filed over a twenty-two-year period.  See 1993 Hearings, supra, at 114 app. A (testimony 
of William R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission).  Other studies submitted to Congress questioned how investor 
recoveries in settled suits compared to their asserted losses.  See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR 
& VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS II:  WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLD-
ER CLASS ACTIONS? (2003) (finding that increases in settlements are not proportionate 
to the damages and losses suffered), in 1993 Hearings, supra, at 739.  Not all testimony 
before the hearing, however, was empirically based.  See, e.g., 1993 Hearings, supra, at 12 
(statement of Edward R. McCracken, Jr., President, Silicon Graphics, Inc.) (asserting 
that an unforeseen decline of ten percent or more in his company’s stock price was 
followed by the filing of a class action complaint alleging securities fraud, and that 
stock price volatility invites abuse of securities fraud litigation).  These kinds of  asser-
tions, however, lack empirical support.  See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legis-
lating on a False Foundation:  The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 960-62 (1996) (finding that one 
oft-cited study asserting that lawsuits are almost always filed against a company with 
significantly declining stock was flawed and inconsistent with results from a replicated 
study drawing from a broader data pool).   
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ries, and we genuinely believe they are.  We also believe, however, that 
the full measure of the costs and benefits of securities class actions re-
quires a broader inquiry than has been pursued in scholarly literature. 
To be sure, some studies have examined the direct effects of suits.  
These studies report that firms involved in securities fraud incur a 
substantial reputational loss, as measured by declines in the short-term 
market value of their securities following revelation of their prior 
transgressions.8  Moreover, firms frequently terminate executives link-
ed to such misrepresentations.9  Each of these outcomes provides its 
own disciplining force and ought to be weighed on the positive side of 
securities class actions.  But is there a hidden dark side to the success-
ful prosecution of a securities class action?  Do the revelation of earli-
er misstatements, the initiation of a private suit, and the payment of a 
substantial settlement weaken the defendant firm so that, from the 
point of view of well-received financial metrics, the firm is permanent-
ly worse off as a consequence of the settlement? 
In part, the answer to this question depends on why the fraud oc-
curred in the first place.  In general, the motivations for false financial 
reporting are not hard to divine.  Mainly, it is a harmful mixture of 
overoptimism, greed, and a perceived need to play catch-up.  Execu-
tive suites are populated more often than not by risk-seeking, self-
confident individuals.10  Many claim that stock options are necessary to 
incentivize managers who are, unlike the firms’ diversified owners, 
overinvested in the firm, and hence do not share the same risk prefe-
rence as the firm’s owners.  Moreover, absent some skin in the game, 
managers will impose substantial agency costs on the firm by attempt-
ing to maximize their own utility by, for instance, shirking in their du-
ties.11  However, the literature supports the view that the virtue of 
8 See infra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that the drop in present val-
ue of future cash flow is many times greater than the litigation penalties). 
9 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that the vast majority of indi-
viduals identified as responsible parties lose their jobs). 
10 Professor Donald Langevoort has extensively investigated this issue.  See, e.g., 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mis-
lead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-41 
(1997) (noting that self-delusion, excessive optimism, and self-confidence are beha-
vioral traits valued within firms and drive managers to risky behavior); Donald C. Lan-
gevoort, Essay, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat:  Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals 
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others, and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 
299-301 (2004) (finding that the tournament model of achievement in firms dispro-
portionately rewards overconfidence and extreme optimism). 
11 For the classic work on this point, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meck-
ling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
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stock options is also a vice, as compensation based on firm value is as-
sociated with abnormal accounting accruals and even fraud as execu-
tives try to make sure they catch the golden goose.12  So there can be 
too much of a good thing. 
Pure greed can motivate insider trading as well.  In addition to de-
frauding the investors on the other sides of these trades, insiders have 
strong incentives to distort the flow of information to the market to 
maximize their gains in these transactions.  Such distortions lead quick-
ly to frauds that affect the entire universe of traders and often result in 
enforcement actions against the perpetrators. 
Much fraudulent reporting arises from the so-called “last period 
problem,”13 in which, faced with the possibility of failing to meet the 
expectations of the “Street,” executives opt for accounting chicanery 
to borrow that missed nickel per share from the future in the wild, un-
supported belief that in the next fiscal period, they will incur unfore-
seen good fortune that will balance out the unforeseen bad fortune of 
FIN. ECON. 305, 353 (1976), which prescribes the use of stock price–based compensa-
tion to link managers to owners more closely.  The paradigmatic success of such a 
linkage is the compensation structure common to private equity firms.  See, e.g., PAUL 
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 425, 435 
(1992) (reporting that research has shown that stock markets respond positively to the 
adoption of executive incentive programs); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 
(studying the effectiveness of stock-based incentives in leveraged management buyouts 
facilitated by private equity firms), in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2542 (O. 
Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999).  For general discussions regarding the idea that 
stock-based performance pay is not simply an antidote to an agency problem but also 
the manifestation of an agency problem, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Ex-
ecutive Compensation as an Agency Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71. 
12 There is an extensive literature on the perverse effects of stock-based compensa-
tion.  See, e.g., JENNIFER FRANCIS, PER OLSSON & KATHERINE SCHIPPER, STOCKHOLM 
INST. FOR FIN. RESEARCH, REPORT NO. 34, CALL OPTIONS AND ACCRUALS QUALITY 3-4 
(2005), available at http://www.sifr.org/Pdfs/sifr-wp34.pdf (noting that greater sensi-
tivity to returns volatility in option-based compensation worsens the quality of earnings 
accruals); Terry Baker et al., Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incen-
tives, 18 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 557, 559 (2003) (noting the use of discretionary ac-
cruals and the decrease in current earnings in periods before firms grant options to 
executives); Eli Bartov & Partha Mohanram, Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, 
and Executive Stock-Option Exercises, 79 ACCT. REV. 889, 891 (2004) (finding that higher 
income-increasing accruals systematically precede the exercise of executive stock op-
tions); Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Manage-
ment, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 511, 513 (2006) (observing that aggressive use of discretionary 
earnings accruals by CEOs are associated with performance-based executive options).  
13 See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets:  Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693-95, 727-30 (presenting evi-
dence consistent with view that a significant portion of market frauds are driven by 
managers’ quest to avoid loss of compensation, perquisites, and positions due to dete-
rioration in their firms’ performance). 
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the current period.  When the next period arrives and there is not 
good fortune, but rather more unforeseen bad fortune, managers 
borrow even more against the future to cover the ten cents per share 
that they are already down, and so forth, exponentially.  Thus, it is the 
combination of overoptimism and overinvestment in the firm that 
frequently leads managers to make false financial reports. 
In this Article, we focus on the cost side of securities class actions.  
We examine whether firms involved in settled securities class actions 
experience long-term weaknesses in their performance, as measured 
by standard metrics of financial performance and position in the pe-
riod before the first misstated report (which begins the class period 
for the resulting securities class action).  To test this hypothesis, we 
compare the subject firms with a matched cohort of firms.  We select 
cohorts by using standard industry classification and by matching 
classes within the discrete industry by asset size. 
Our ultimate focus, however, is the impact of the suit and the set-
tlement on the firm’s vitality.  While no doubt exaggerated, there is a 
good deal of commentary that litigation not only weakens companies 
financially and makes them less competitive but actually leads to 
bankruptcy.  Although commentators level these claims at litigation 
generally (particularly product liability claims and punitive damage 
awards), the securities class action is not immune to such claims.  The 
argument is that the sums needed to defend the suit and pay the set-
tlement do not come solely from an insurance policy but also from the 
corporation itself.14  On top of this cost impact, there is the deflection 
of executive attention and the depression of morale and reputation.  
In combination, these various impacts are harmful to the financial 
health of the firm.  We therefore hypothesize that well-recognized fi-
nancial metrics bearing on the firm’s financial performance and posi-
tion will reflect the ill effects of revelation of earlier false financial re-
ports.  We look for evidence of such adverse effects in the post-lawsuit, 
as well as post-settlement, years, and pay special attention to any corre-
lation between the settlement size vis-à-vis the defendant firm’s asset 
size and financial metrics. 
We also examine other potential effects of securities fraud class 
action suits on the future health of the targeted firms.  For example, 
14 See ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE ECO-
NOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1, 16-17 (2005) (arguing that 
because public companies are primarily owned by well-diversified institutional inves-
tors, securities class actions are likely to yield net benefits only in merger and initial-
public-offering settings due to the circularity of recovery that would otherwise occur). 
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scholars have said much about the benefits of the PSLRA’s lead-
plaintiff provision.15  We therefore consider whether the nature of the 
lead plaintiff has an indirect effect on the future health of the firm be-
ing sued.  Congress designed the lead-plaintiff provision to stop the 
class action’s representative from being decided by a race to the 
courthouse, which was the predominant practice prior to PSLRA.  
Now, the court appoints the most adequate plaintiff, who is presumed 
to be the petitioning party with the most significant financial loss as-
sociated with the alleged fraud.16  A perceived benefit of the institu-
tional lead plaintiff at the helm is that it would not only serve as a gov-
ernor on the initiation of the suit but, as an institutional investor, 
would also be equally engaged in crafting a responsible settlement at 
the suit’s conclusion.17  Several plaintiffs’ law firms sought to make in-
stitutional clients lead plaintiffs by championing those clients’ ba-
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).  
For an empirical study of the impact that the type of plaintiff has on settlements, see 
Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter?  The Impact of the 
Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 
870 (2005), which reported a significant relationship between public-pension-fund 
lead plaintiffs and larger settlements, but questioned whether these institutions “cher-
ry-pick” cases because the authors did not control for variables such as the presence of 
an SEC action.  See also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?  An 
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 
1624, 1630-31 (2006) (finding a positive and significant relationship between institu-
tional lead plaintiffs and higher settlements even with the introduction of variables 
such as the presence of an SEC action); James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, 
There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs:  An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Ac-
tion Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 378-80 (2008) (same); Michael A. Perino, Institu-
tional Activism Through Litigation:  An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participa-
tion in Securities Class Actions (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (noting 
that institutions appear to reduce fee awards to class counsel and finding that, while 
controlling for variables such as accounting restatements and SEC enforcement action, 
there is some reason to believe that institutions do not cherry-pick cases). 
16 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb), 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (creating a rebuttable presumption that the 
most adequate lead plaintiff is the petitioner with “the largest financial interest in the 
relief sought by the class”). 
17 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 15, at 1593-1602 (reviewing the multiple benefits 
of an engaged lead plaintiff).  Congressional records surrounding the enactment of 
the PSLRA variously extolled the virtues of the lead plaintiff, which was presumed gen-
erally to be an institutional investor.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.) (observing that prior to the PSLRA, the race-to-the-courthouse system 
prevented “institutional investors from selecting counsel or serving as lead plaintiff[s],” 
and expressing the hope that “increasing the role of institutional investors in class ac-
tions will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 
(1995) (“[I]ncreasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately 
benefit the class and assist the courts.”).  
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lanced approach to settlement, rather than gearing up for the type of 
scorched-earth policy that would have appealed to General Sherman 
(but would have made him unpopular in Atlanta).  The presumption 
is that informed institutions would more closely calibrate the settle-
ment to the ongoing health of the defendant firm, trading off correc-
tive governance steps for larger settlements.18  Thus, we layer onto our 
earlier analysis of the firm’s post-suit financial metrics with the ques-
tion of whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff impacts 
the observed effects on the target firm. 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is extensive empirical literature studying the enforcement 
of the federal securities laws.19  However, only a few papers have ex-
plored issues that bear directly on the subject of this project.  In Part 
II, we summarize those studies most relevant to our work. 
The study that most closely relates to ours is by Professors Marci-
ukaityte, Szewczyk, Uzun, and Varma.20  Within their sample of com-
panies that have experienced fraud of different types—including 
fraud on stakeholders, fraud on the government, financial-reporting 
fraud, and regulatory violations—they examine whether there are 
corporate-governance or performance changes at the firms involved 
in the years following the fraud.  They find that, in the subsequent 
years, the accused firms increased the proportion of independent di-
rectors on their boards and on key monitoring committees of their 
boards.21  More importantly for our purposes, they find that the long-
run stock price and operating-performance measures of firms accused 
of fraud were comparable to a control set of matched firms.  Even 
though they uncover large, negative cumulative abnormal returns in 
18 See Max W. Berger et al., Institutional Investors as Lead Plaintiffs:  Is There a New and 
Changing Landscape?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 31-32 (2001) (reviewing the expanding 
role of lead institutions in securities class actions and their impact on the contours of 
settlements); Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:  
The Role of Institutional Investors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 155, 156-58 
(reviewing the multiple settlement benefits that institutional investors provide in securi-
ties class actions, including oversight of class counsel and sophistication in resources). 
19 For a recent summary of this literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience:  A Survey of Empirical Studies of the 
Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009).  For a 
slightly older but very comprehensive survey, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Secur-
ities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468-1504 (2004). 
20 Dalia Marciukaityte et al., Governance and Performance Changes after Accusations of 
Corporate Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 2006, at 32. 
21 Id. at 34-37. 
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stock price in the two-day period following the announcement of the 
fraud, they observed no statistically significant abnormal returns for 
the one- and five-year buy-and-hold strategies.  Their findings are con-
sistent with the theory of no abnormal stock performance in the post-
fraud period.22  Finally, for the five years following the disclosure of 
the fraud, they observe no “significant long-term effect” in any of the 
operating performance measures that they examine.23 
Although this study does not use firms targeted in securities fraud 
class actions as the basis for its sample, it does shed some light on post-
accusation financial performance of fraud companies.  For our pur-
poses, the study finds that firms experiencing fraud may recover 
quickly from the fraud and readjust their corporate governance struc-
tures to ensure that they do not experience another similar incident.  
It also suggests using a set of potential measures of operating perfor-
mance, including return on assets and market-to-book ratio, which are 
useful as parameters in our study. 
A second study related to ours is by Professors Karpoff, Lee, and 
Martin.24  Using a sample of government enforcement actions against 
585 firms from 1978 to 2002, they find that, while the litigation sanc-
tions from SEC penalties are far from trivial, averaging $23.5 million 
per firm, the reputational sanction suffered by the offending entity for 
committing fraud is huge, with the decline in the present value of fu-
ture cash flow being in excess of 7.5 times the litigation sanction.25  
The authors calculate that for every dollar of the firm’s market value 
inflated by the fraudulent representation upon disclosure of the viola-
tion, the firm ultimately loses a dollar plus an additional $3.08.26  
Moreover, the loss is larger if the firm survives (about sixty-six percent 
of this amount is reputational cost with the balance being market 
value adjustments and legal defense costs).27  So understood, telling a 
lie and getting caught is not a value-enriching strategy. 
In the face of such serious costs borne by the firm as a result of its 
managers’ deceptions, it is not surprising that, in a related paper, the 
same authors report that nearly ninety-four percent of the individuals 
identified as being responsible for the false statements lose their jobs 
22 Id. at 37-38. 
23 Id. at 40. 
24 Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 581-82. 
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by the end of the enforcement proceedings, and that a majority of 
them are fired by their firms.28  Culpable managers are more likely to 
lose their jobs when their misconduct is accompanied by insider trad-
ing, their conduct is harmful to the company, the firm is young or fi-
nancially troubled, or when the firm has an independent board.29  
These findings suggest that markets do play an important role in pun-
ishing fraud and that shareholder litigation serves a secondary function 
in this regard, although litigation does add meaningful monetary sanc-
tions and may stimulate the firm to discipline the wrongdoers harshly.  
However, these papers do not explore private securities class actions’ 
long-term impact on the targeted firms’ financial-performance metrics. 
A large number of studies have examined the stock price effects of 
the various events leading up to, and including, the filing of a private 
securities fraud class action.  These studies consistently find that the 
disclosure of financial fraud yields a large negative market reaction to 
the bad news.30  The filing of a securities fraud lawsuit arising out of the 
same events that led to the fraudulent conduct, or corrective disclo-
sures, leads to a separate and statistically significant decline in the 
company’s stock price.31  There is some evidence that, at the time of 
the filing of the case, the stock market efficiently estimates the strength 
28 See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepre-
sentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 209, 212 (2008) (finding that 93.6% of those identified 
in the government prosecution lose their job, and that for responsible parties who are 
officers, 92.4% lose their jobs; observing that firing occurs more quickly when the 
board chair is not held by the firm’s chief executive officer).  
29 See id. at 213 (concluding that culpable managers are more likely to retain their 
positions when they have significant holdings in the firm or the SEC drops charges 
against them).  Directors also suffer reputational consequences when the SEC files 
charges against their companies or when their firms pay large settlements in private se-
curities fraud class actions.  See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-
Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (2006) (finding that a reputational 
penalty only followed suits with settlement amounts in the top quartile or in which the 
SEC also brought action).  However, outside of these two situations, the filing of a pri-
vate securities fraud class action appears to have no reputational effect on directors.  Id. 
30 See, e.g., Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud 
Class Actions Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1 (Univ. of Mich. John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Paper No. 01-009, 2001), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=288216 (finding “a large and statistically significant negative [stock 
market] reaction” to “the revelation of potential fraud”); see also Sanjai Bhagat, John 
Bizjak & Jeffrey L. Coles, The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits, FIN. 
MGMT., Winter 1998, at 5, 6-7 (reporting an average loss of 0.97% of the market value 
of defendant firms’ equity during the two-day period following the announcement of a 
lawsuit, but no significant loss in the two-day period following settlement). 
31 See Ferris & Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1 (observing a negative price reaction to 
both allegations of fraud and the filing of a class action). 
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of the plaintiff’s case.32  This is consistent with findings in other studies 
that settlement values are related to the seriousness of the claims in the 
case, the length of the class period (which measures the period of time 
over which shareholders were misled), and the degree of overoptimism 
in the firm’s disclosures during the class period.33 
A final paper that relates to our work is by Professors Cheng, 
Huang, Li, and Lobo.34  This study uses a set of securities fraud class 
actions to examine the determinants of their likelihood of surviving a 
motion to dismiss and, for those surviving, the determinants of any 
settlement amounts, plus any subsequent governance changes at the 
targeted firms.35  Most relevant for our purposes, the authors find that 
suits with institutional lead plaintiffs are associated with greater im-
provements in board independence than suits with individual lead 
plaintiffs.36  This suggests that the presence of an institutional lead 
plaintiff in a securities class action may be associated with corporate 
governance improvements.  The study does not, however, examine 
changes in operating performance of targeted firms and therefore is 
silent on whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff is likely 
to lead to improved performance in the post-fraud period. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
ON DEFENDANTS’ FINANCIAL HEALTH AND  
STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE 
A.  Description of Data 
Our sample consists of 480 companies that were defendants in set-
tled securities class actions whose class period commenced after 1996 
(the inaugural year of the PSLRA).  Because we examine whether the 
defendant’s financial well-being and stock market performance 
changed relative to its peer group across different time periods be-
32 See Paul A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation:  
An Analysis of Sequential and Conditional Information, 40 ABACUS 21, 25 (2004) (finding 
evidence that the filing of stronger fraud cases correlate to larger stock price declines). 
33 See James D. Beck & Sanjai Bhagat, Shareholder Litigation:  Share Price Movements, 
News Releases, and Settlement Amounts, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 563, 564 (1997) 
(noting that these findings are limited to a sample of settled cases that were studied); 
Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 15, at 376 (discovering that provable losses, total assets, 
and presence of SEC action are positively correlated with settlement amount). 
34 C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 
J. FIN. ECON. 356 (2010). 
35 Id. at 356. 
36 Id. at 357. 
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fore, during, and after the class action, we have set this time restric-
tion to avoid the confounding effect of the implementation of the 
PSLRA for cases with a class period starting prior to 1996.  We use set-
tled suits, rather than complaints filed, because settled suits reflect the 
full impact of litigation and also are more likely indicative that the 
firm has committed, with scienter, a material misrepresentation. 
PACER37 was our main source for much of the information bear-
ing on the litigation for our sample firms, such as the identity of the 
lead plaintiff, the complaint and settlement dates, and the settlement 
amount.  We also reviewed SEC Litigation Releases38 and the Lexis-
Nexis electronic database39 to ascertain whether there was a parallel 
SEC enforcement proceeding.  Our sources for financial restatements 
made by defendant companies were reports by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO),40 and LexisNexis searches for the res-
tatement period when that information was missing from the GAO 
reports.  COMPUSTAT41 was our source for the data used to calculate 
financial ratios, and CRSP42 was our source for the stock price data 
used to calculate stock returns. 
We compare the performance of sample defendants with that of a 
cohort of comparable companies for each time period as defined be-
low.  For any given time period, a company is deemed “comparable” 
to a sample defendant if it satisfies three criteria:  (1) it has the same 
SIC43 code; (2) it is in the same asset-size group; and (3) it has not 
37 PACER, http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), is an 
online database supported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  It provides 
online access to U.S. appellate and district court opinions. 
38 The SEC issues these releases, describing civil lawsuits it has brought in federal 
court.  They can be found at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml. 
39 LexisNexis Academic, http://academic.lexisnexis.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
40 For financial restatement data from 1997 to 2002, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:  TRENDS, MARKET IM-
PACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES (2002).  For financial 
restatement data from 2002 to 2005, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-
678, FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS:  UPDATE OF PUBLIC COMPANY TRENDS, MARKET IM-
PACTS, AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (2006). 
41 Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ Compustat, http://www.standardandpoors. 
com/products-services/capitaliq-compustat/en/us (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  This 
database was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services, http:// 
wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
42 Center for Research in Security Prices, http://www.crsp.com/products/ 
stocks.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  This database was accessed through Wharton 
Research Data Services, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
43 The United States government uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system to classify industries by four-digit codes.  See SEC, CF SIC Code List, http:// 
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been involved in any securities class action litigation during the rele-
vant time period.  We use the following increments to match asset 
size:  less than $10 million, $10 to $50 million, $50 to $100 million, 
$100 to $500 million, $500 million to $1 billion, $1 to $5 billion, and 
$5 billion or higher.  If we identify multiple comparable companies for 
any sample defendant in any time period, we rank them by the differ-
ence between their asset size and the asset size of the sample defen-
dant, ultimately choosing up to three companies with the smallest dif-
ference.  If we do not identify a comparable company for a sample 
defendant in any given time period, we do not include observations for 
that sample defendant in those time periods in our analysis. 
We focus on the following time periods in our analysis:  (1) one 
year before the start of the class period (“Pre-class Period”); (2) the 
filing of the complaint to one year thereafter, provided no settlement 
had been reached by then (“Year 1 Post-lawsuit”); (3) one to two years 
after the start of the lawsuit if no settlement had been reached by then 
(“Year 2 Post-lawsuit”); (4) two to three years after the start of the law-
suit if no settlement had been reached by then (“Year 3 Post-lawsuit”); 
(5) the year in which settlement was reached (“Year of Settlement”); 
(6) one year after settlement was reached (“Year 1 Post-settlement”); 
(7) one to two years after settlement was reached (“Year 2 Post-
settlement”); and (8) two to three years after settlement was reached 
(“Year 3 Post-settlement”). 
We focus on the following parameters in comparing sample de-
fendants’ performance with that of comparable companies:  (1) the 
Asset Turnover,44 to capture the company’s efficiency in asset utiliza-
tion for generating revenues; (2) the Return-on-Assets ratio,45 to cap-
ture the company’s overall profitability; (3) the Earnings Before In-
terest and Tax payments (“EBIT”)-to-Total Assets ratio, to capture the 
company’s income from operations; (4) the Current Ratio,46 to cap-
ture the company’s debt-service capability and liquidity level; (5) Alt-
man’s Z-score,47 to capture the company’s overall financial-distress lev-
www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing a list of 
SIC codes indicating business type). 
44 Asset turnover is the ratio of sales to total assets. 
45 Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets. 
46 Current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
47 Altman’s Z-score is a multivariate measurement of the financial health of a 
company and a powerful diagnostic tool that forecasts the probability that a company 
will enter bankruptcy within a two-year period. 
 Altman’s Z-score = .012X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + 0.999X5. 
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el and propensity for bankruptcy; (6) the Market-to-Book ratio,48 to 
capture a company’s growth opportunities;49 and (7) the One-Year 
Stock Return,50 to capture the annual stock price appreciation (with-
out adding in dividends).51 
Except for the One-Year Stock Price Returns, we use the financial 
ratios reported by sample defendants and comparable companies as 
of the end of their respective fiscal years from 1996 to 2008.  For ex-
ample, for a settlement firm that had a Pre-class Period starting on 
September 15, 2000, a lawsuit filed on March 10, 2003, and a settle-
ment announced on July 8, 2005, we use financial ratios for the fiscal 
years 1999, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 for the Pre-class Period, 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year of Settlement, Year 1 Post-settlement, Year 2 
Post-settlement, and Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively.  In this hypo-
thetical, there would be no observation for Year 2 Post-lawsuit and Year 
3 Post-lawsuit because those time periods coincide with, or occur after, 
the Year of Settlement. 
For the One-Year Stock Returns, we use daily market-close prices 
from CRSP to calculate annual stock returns with starting and ending 
dates that correspond precisely to those of the time periods pertinent 
to our study.  To use the example given above, we calculate the return 
for the Pre-class Period by taking the difference in the natural loga-
rithm of the market-close price on September 14, 2000, and the natu-
ral logarithm of the market-close price on September 15, 1999. 
Table 1 reports the number of observations we are able to retain for 
each period from our initial 480 cases, after we remove sample firms for 
which there were no comparable companies or for which there were 
missing data entries for either the sample firms or their comparable 
With X1 being working capital/total assets, X2 being retained earnings/total assets, X3 
being EBIT/total assets, X4 being market value of equity/book value of total liability, 
and X5 being sales/total assets.  See Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant 
Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 594-96 (1968) (describ-
ing the variables incorporated into the Z-score). 
48 Market-to-book is the ratio of the market price for the company’s stocks to the 
company’s book value per share. 
49 Market-to-book ratio is often used to show whether the market is attaching a 
high (or low) value to a company’s stock relative to the value of the stock calculated 
based on the cost value of the company’s assets.  A higher market-to-book ratio than 
peers indicates that the market expects the company to do better than those peers in 
the future, and a lower market-to-book ratio indicates a contrary market sentiment. 
50 The one-year stock price return is the difference in the natural logarithm of 
market close price on the last day and the first day of a given one-year period. 
51 In this Article, these terms, as well as the defined time periods, will be capita-
lized when they reference the parameters in the current study. 
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companies from any of our earlier-described data sources.  We matched 
our database of securities class action settlements with Lynn M. Lo-
Pucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database.52  We find that forty-three of the 
companies in our sample filed for bankruptcy protection during our 
study time period.  We will discuss the effects of this loss of sample firms 
on our results where they are relevant in the remainder of the Article. 
 
Table 1:  Number of Observations 
 
  Post-lawsuit  Post-settlement 
  
Pre-
class 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Settle-
ment 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Financial 
Ratios 254 139 65 32 142 127 113 72 
Stock 
Returns 
124 108 70 30 N/A 93 92 79 
 
 
The number of observations for Year 2 and Year 3 for post-lawsuit 
time periods decreases because some cases settled before those pe-
riods ended, as was illustrated in the example given above.  In that ex-
ample, there was no observation for Year 2 Post-lawsuit and Year 3 
Post-lawsuit because a settlement occurred during Year 2 Post-lawsuit. 
B.  Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are reported in Tables 2 and 3 below. Table 2 
reports the mean and median values of financial ratios and stock re-
turns for sample defendants at specified time periods.  It shows how 
those parameters have changed before, during, and after the comple-
tion of securities class actions.  Table 3 reports the number and per-
centage of sample defendants that underperformed compared to 
their peer groups in the financial parameters during the relevant 
time periods.  Together, these two tables provide the first clue re-
garding how sample defendants fared after the start of class actions, 
both in terms of changes in the values of the financial parameters 
and in terms of changes in the relative performance of sample de-
52 Professor LoPucki generously provided his database to us for this purpose.  The 
database can be accessed from http://www.lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.  We thank Professor 
LoPucki for his permission to use his data. 
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fendants to the performance of comparable companies.  If securities 
class actions impacted the financial health and stock market perfor-
mance of sample defendants, we should see time-varying patterns in 
at least some of these statistics. 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics of Financial Ratios and 
Stock Returns of Sample Defendants 
 
  Post-lawsuit  Post-settlement 
Financial  
Parameters 
Pre-
class 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Settle-
ment 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Asset Turnover         
- Mean 0.95 1.07 1.12 1.10 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.05 
- Median 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 
Return-on-Assets         
- Mean -0.14 -0.31 -0.21 -0.09 -0.11 -0.29 -0.01 -0.02 
- Median 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
EBIT/Total  
Assets 
        
- Mean -0.09 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.26 -0.03 -0.09 
- Median 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Current Ratio         
- Mean 2.93 2.94 2.84 3.56 3.06 3.14 2.61 2.73 
- Median 1.59 1.59 1.47 1.57 1.80 1.80 1.66 1.65 
Altman’s  
Z-score 
        
- Mean 6.17 2.96 2.90 3.93 3.20 3.87 3.48 3.17 
- Median 4.23 2.07 2.40 2.36 2.52 2.94 3.32 2.93 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio         
- Mean 6.84 4.80 3.95 2.17 3.64 3.56 3.78 3.30 
- Median 3.67 1.80 1.97 2.00 2.02 2.27 2.21 2.28 
One-Year 
Stock Return         
- Mean 0.13 -0.23 0.03 0.13 N/A 0.06 0.08 0.02 
- Median 0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.11 N/A 0.08 0.06 0.04 
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Table 3:  Number and Percentage of Sample Defendants 
Underperforming Comparable Companies 
 
 Post-lawsuit  Post-settlement 
Financial  
Parameters 
Pre-
class 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Settle-
ment 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Asset Turnover        
- Number 166 80 37 17 78 74 65 39 
- Percentage 65.60% 57.60% 57.80% 54.80% 55.70% 59.20% 59.10% 55.70% 
Return-on-
Assets 
       
- Number 143 85 35 20 78 64 64 43 
- Percentage 56.50% 61.20% 54.70% 64.50% 55.70% 51.20% 58.20% 61.40% 
EBIT/Total 
Assets 
       
- Number 145 90 37 22 79 71 66 48 
- Percentage 58.70% 65.70% 58.70% 71.00% 56.80% 58.20% 61.70% 68.60% 
Current Ratio        
- Number 101 64 24 16 72 65 60 36 
- Percentage 45.30% 52.50% 42.10% 55.20% 57.10% 59.10% 62.50% 55.40% 
Altman’s 
Z-score 
       
- Number 68 59 30 15 56 57 53 38 
- Percentage 43.90% 56.20% 60.00% 62.50% 52.30% 56.40% 63.10% 64.40% 
Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
       
- Number 69 66 27 14 60 61 56 33 
- Percentage 34.80% 55.90% 56.30% 56.00% 50.00% 57.00% 60.20% 55.00% 
One-Year 
Stock Return 
       
- Number 64 67 31 12 N/A 50 45 32 
- Percentage 51.60% 62.00% 44.30% 40.00% N/A 53.80% 48.90% 40.50% 
 
 
Our initial focus is whether and how securities class actions af-
fected sample defendants’ sales levels.  Sales revenues are the source 
of a company’s profit and hence an important metric of its perfor-
mance.  A priori, the effects of securities class actions were not clear to 
us because there were competing arguments that could lead revenue 
performance in different directions.  On one hand, sales levels de-
pend on factors such as the company’s market share, product quality, 
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and the extent and efficiency of sales channels, all of which change 
relatively slowly over time with factors such as customer tastes, manu-
facturing techniques, and marketing strategies.  On the other hand, 
allegations of fraud may hurt the company’s reputation and cause cus-
tomers to sever business ties.53  In addition, lawsuits may prompt man-
agement to increase product prices (thereby reducing price competi-
tiveness) in order to offset any anticipated increase in the company’s 
financial burden due to settlement payments or to fully reflect costs 
that may have been fraudulently underreported earlier. 
The efficiency in revenue generation with existing assets is reflect-
ed in the Asset Turnover (sales to total assets) ratio.  In terms of 
changes in this ratio over time, Table 2 shows a higher mean in every 
post-lawsuit and post-settlement period, and a higher median in most 
post-lawsuit and post-settlement periods, than in the Pre-class Period.54  
These numbers suggest that sample defendants’ sales levels in the post-
lawsuit periods did not decline after the start of the class action.  In 
terms of changes in sample defendants’ relative performance to their 
peer groups, Table 3 shows that the percentage of sample defendants 
with an inferior Asset Turnover ratio than their peers was actually low-
er in each of the post-lawsuit periods than the Pre-class Period level of 
65.6%.  Hence, our data reflects that defendant firms in our sample did 
not on average suffer from reduced sales opportunities as a result of 
their involvement in securities class actions.  However, our sample has a 
possible upward selection bias caused by the exclusion of forty-three 
firms that went bankrupt during our sample period, perhaps due to 
diminished sales revenues.  Financial data for such firms were unavaila-
ble from COMPUSTAT and the lack of data resulted in these firms’ ex-
clusion from our data sample. 
Our next focus is the sample defendants’ profitability, which was 
captured in the Return-on-Assets and the EBIT/Total Assets ratios.  In 
terms of Return-on-Assets, Table 2 shows that the mean and median 
values were lower than that of the cohort in the first two years after 
the lawsuit, as well as in the first year after settlement, than in the Pre-
53 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear 
from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 790-93 (1993) (finding a de-
crease, albeit small, in company earnings following an announcement that the com-
pany engaged in fraud). 
54 Significance tests have shown that these changes are insignificant.  In the t-test 
for the difference in the mean, the p -values are 0.82, 0.68, 0.96, 0.95, 1.00, 0.97, and 
0.93 from Year 1 Post-lawsuit to Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively.  In the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test for the difference in the median, the p -values are 0.13, 0.13, 0.29, 0.12, 
0.13, 0.11, and 0.12, respectively. 
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class Period.  Significance tests showed that the differences were sig-
nificant for the median55 but insignificant for the mean.56  In terms of 
sample defendants’ relative performance, Table 3 shows a higher un-
derperforming percentage in Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year 3 Post-lawsuit, 
and Year 3 Post-settlement.  These numbers suggest some deteriora-
tion in defendants’ ultimate profitability vis-à-vis firms in their cohort 
in the post-lawsuit periods. 
In terms of the EBIT/Total Assets ratio, Table 2 shows that the 
mean was lower in the first year after the lawsuit and the first and 
third year after settlement than the Pre-class Period, and the median 
was lower in each year after the start of the lawsuit until Year 1 Post-
settlement.  The differences in the mean values between post-lawsuit 
periods and the Pre-class Period were insignificant,57 but the differ-
ences in the median were significant.58  Table 3 reports a higher per-
centage of defendant firms underperforming compared to their peers 
in four out of seven post-lawsuit periods.  A lower EBIT-to-total-assets 
ratio indicates deterioration in the net-operating-income levels, which, 
in the absence of any reduction in sales revenues, marks an increase 
in operating costs and a decrease in operating efficiency. 
We next examine the sample defendants’ liquidity (i.e., the ability 
to repay short-term liabilities with short-term assets), as reflected in 
the Current Ratio parameter.  The higher the current ratio, the more 
able the company is to satisfy its short-term obligations as they ma-
ture.59  We pay special attention to the ratio in the settlement year and 
thereafter because settlements, to the extent they exceed insurance 
coverage, must be paid out of the defendants’ liquid assets and thus 
reduce the funds available to meet future short-term obligations.  The 
summary statistics in Table 2 show that the Current Ratio had a higher 
55 For Return-on-Assets, the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test showed a p -value that was 
less than 0.0001 between Year 1 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period, a p -value of 0.06 
between Year 2 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period, and a p -value of 0.04 between Year 
1 Post-settlement and the Pre-class Period.  For EBIT/Total Assets, the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test showed a p -value that was less than 0.0001 between Year 1 Post-lawsuit and the 
Pre-class Period, a p -value of 0.03 between Year 2 Post-lawsuit and the Pre-class Period, 
and a p -value of 0.1 between Year of Settlement and the Pre-class Period. 
56 The t-test showed a p -value that was close to 1.00 as between each year post-
lawsuit and the Pre-class Period.  
57 The p -values in the t-tests were close to 0. 
58 The p -values in the Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests were less than 0.0001, 0.03, 0.04, 
and 0.1 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit, Year 2 Post-lawsuit, Year 3 Post-lawsuit, and the Year of 
Settlement, respectively. 
59 A higher current ratio reflects a higher proportion of current assets relative to 
current liabilities, indicating greater liquidity. 
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mean in the Year of Settlement and Year 1 Post-settlement than in the 
Pre-class Period, and a higher median in each period from settlement 
to three years thereafter.60  Although these numbers do not suggest 
deterioration in sample defendants’ liquidity levels in the post-
settlement periods compared to the Pre-class Period level, the relative 
performance numbers in Table 3 show a substantial increase in sam-
ple defendant firms underperforming compared to their cohort with 
respect to their Current Ratio in each post-settlement period. 
Altman’s Z-score is a multivariate measurement of a company’s fi-
nancial health and is a powerful predictor of the likelihood of bank-
ruptcy within a two-year period.61  Its calculation is based on the sum-
mation of five financial ratios (i.e., return on assets, sales to total 
assets, debt to equity, working capital to total assets, and retained 
earnings to total assets), each of which is multiplied by a predeter-
mined weight factor.62  A Z-score of 2.99 or above indicates that bank-
ruptcy is not likely, and a Z-score of 1.80 or less indicates that bank-
ruptcy is likely, while a Z-score between 1.81 and 2.99 is in a grey 
area.63  Obviously, a higher Z-score is desirable. 
A priori, we expected some deterioration in sample defendants’ 
Altman’s Z-scores post-lawsuit because the uncertainty of the class ac-
tion’s outcome prior to settlement, the increased financial burden af-
ter settlement, and the combined reputational costs and distractions 
of the suit are factors that might impair the company’s operational ef-
ficiency and also reduce liquid assets available for working capital and 
debt coverage.  This expectation was borne out in the summary statis-
tics.  Table 2 shows that the defendant’s Altman’s Z-score was drasti-
cally lower vis-à-vis its cohort in every post-lawsuit period than in the 
Pre-class Period in both the mean and the median.  Moreover, the 
median was below the healthy level of 3.00 in most of the post-lawsuit 
periods, and the mean was lower still in the first two years of the law-
60 The differences in the mean were insignificant with p -values in t-tests close to 
1.00, but the differences in the median were mostly significant, with p -values being 0.01, 
0.01, 0.05, 0.13, 0.15, 0.04, and 0.09 for the post-lawsuit and post-settlement periods.  
61 The real-world application of the Z-score successfully predicted seventy-two per-
cent of corporate bankruptcies two years prior to those companies filing for Chapter 7.  
Gregory J. Eidleman, Z Scores—A Guide to Failure Prediction, CPA J., Feb. 1995, at 52. 
62 See supra note 47. 
63 See Steven Katz, Steven Lilien & Bert Nelson, Stock Market Behavior Around Bank-
ruptcy Model Distress and Recovery Predictions, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 1985, at 70, 70-
71 (defining the meanings of Z-score ranges).  
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suit.64  These numbers suggest that sample defendants were subject to 
a higher level of financial distress in the post-lawsuit periods.  These 
results may understate the true level of financial distress of targeted 
firms because they do not include the forty-three firms in our sample 
that filed for Chapter 11 protection during the relevant time period.  
In terms of sample defendant firms’ relative performance to their 
peers, Table 3 shows a substantial increase post-lawsuit in the under-
performing percentage from the Pre-class Period level (from 43.9% to 
a range of 52 to 64%).  Thus, sample defendant firms’ distress levels 
appear to have increased in association with their involvement with a 
securities class action in both absolute and comparative terms. 
We are also interested in the stock market performance of sample 
defendant firms’ stock prices, because the market is an important 
channel through which shareholders realize gains from their invest-
ments in the defendant companies.  We used two measures to capture 
stock market performances:  the Market-to-Book ratio and the annual 
Stock Return.  Market-to-book ratio measures the value of the compa-
ny’s stock in the current marketplace relative to the historical ac-
counting value of the company's assets.  Annual return is a measure of 
the increase in the stock’s price over a period of one year.  Sharehold-
ers want higher returns over time, so a high value in both measures is 
desirable from their perspective.65  Because the occurrence of fraud by 
company management is a sign of weak governance and future settle-
ment payments will impose additional financial burdens on the com-
pany, a priori we anticipated negative stock market responses to the 
news of the securities class actions and, hence, inferior Market-to-Book 
ratios in the post-lawsuit periods.  There is abundant evidence of 
plummeting stock prices following an announcement that a company 
is the target of a securities class action.66  However, we had no ex ante 
basis for predicting how long stock prices would remain at their de-
pressed levels after the initial announcement of the filing of the class 
action.  We therefore looked for clues from the defendants’ Market-to-
Book ratios and annual Stock Returns. 
64 The p -values for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test were between 0.002 and 0.004, 
suggesting that the difference across time periods was highly significant.  This observa-
tion holds true for the p -values for the t-test, except for Year 3 Post-lawsuit, which had a 
p -value of 0.15. 
65 See also Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Corporate 
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives:  Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 392 
(1996) (finding that market-to-book ratio is negatively correlated with the probability 
of the submission of corporate-governance proposals by shareholders). 
66 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
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In terms of the Market-to-Book ratio, Table 2 shows that the mean 
and median values for sample defendants were lower in every post-
lawsuit period than the Pre-class Period.  Significance tests show that 
the differences were generally significant.67  There was no evidence of 
positive change in the post-settlement periods.  The Market-to-Book 
ratios in the post-settlement periods reflected mostly lower means but 
higher medians compared to the Year of Settlement.  However, the dif-
ferences were insignificant.68  Compared to their cohort companies, 
about 35% of sample defendants had a lower Market-to-Book ratio in 
the Pre-class Period, but that percentage increased to over 50% in 
every post-lawsuit period.  Moreover, the underperforming percentage 
was higher in post-settlement periods than in the Year of Settlement. 
In terms of annual Stock Returns, the impact of securities class ac-
tions was most evident in the first year after the filing of the lawsuit:  
the mean return dropped from a Pre-class Period level of 13% to -23%, 
while the median dropped from the Pre-class Period level of 7% to 
-12%.69  The mean and median returns were also mostly lower after the 
first year of the lawsuit (except for Year 3 Post-lawsuit), but the differ-
ences were insignificant.70  Comparing the annual returns of sample 
defendant firms with those of the cohort companies, we found that 
62% of sample defendants were underperforming their cohort in Year 
1 Post-lawsuit, a substantial increase from the Pre-class Period level of 
51.6%.  The underperforming percentage improved to better than 
Pre-class Period levels in most time periods after Year 1 Post-lawsuit. 
In sum, the above descriptive statistics report notable and statisti-
cally significant negative changes for firms that are the subject of se-
curities class actions versus their cohort, particularly with respect to 
their operations in terms of efficiency (through EBIT/Total Assets), 
short-term liquidity (through the Current Ratio), overall financial 
67 The p -values of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the median were less than 
0.0001 for each post-lawsuit time period.  The p -values for the t-test for the mean were 
0.5, 0.38, 0.23, 0.04, 0.04, 0.08, and 0.03 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit through Year 3 Post-
settlement, respectively. 
68 The p -values for the t-test for the differences in the mean were close to 1.00, 
and the p -value for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the differences in the median be-
tween Year of Settlement and Year 3 Post-settlement was 0.38. 
69 The differences were significant for both the mean and the median, with p -
values of less than 0.0001 in the significance tests. 
70 The p -values for the t-test were 0.83, 1.00, 0.95, 0.99, and 0.69 from Year 2 Post-
lawsuit through Year 3 Post-settlement, respectively, and the p -values for the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum test were 0.27, 0.28, 0.38, 0.49, and 0.20, respectively. 
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health (through Altman’s Z-score), and stock market performance 
(through the Market-to-Book ratio). 
C.  Multivariate Regressions 
Having described the summary statistics of key financial parameters 
in the previous Section, we now use multivariate analysis to examine the 
performance of sample defendants along those parameters across dif-
ferent time periods and relative to their comparable companies.  In or-
der to preserve the comparative nature of our analysis, we focus on the 
question of how each of our sample firms performs in comparison to its 
matched firms.  Thus, our dependent variables are constructed by de-
termining whether the defendant firms performed better or worse than 
the matched sample firms, as we explain more fully below. 
1.  Model Specification 
We ran a logit regression using as dependent variables, in separate 
equations, the underperformance measures for Sales/Total Assets, 
Return-on-Asset, EBIT/Total Assets, the Current Ratio, Altman’s Z-
score, Market-to-Book ratio, and One-Year Stock Return, respectively.  
The dependent variable was a dummy that takes the value of “1” if the 
sample company underperforms its comparables in the parameter for 
the examined time period, and is “0” otherwise.  For example, if a 
sample defendant company had an Altman’s Z-score of 4.80 during 
the Pre-class Period and the average Z-score of comparable companies 
for the same time period was 5.20, the defendant was regarded as un-
derperforming its peers and thus received an entry of “1” for the de-
pendent variable for the Pre-class Period.  If the same defendant firm 
had a Z-score of 6.50 for Year 1 Post-lawsuit, and the average Z-score 
of comparable companies for the same time period was 6.10, the de-
fendant was not underperforming and thus received an entry of “0” 
for the dependent variable for Year 1 Post-lawsuit. 
In our regressions, we used the following independent variables.  
First, we included a dummy variable for each of the time periods speci-
fied in Section III.A of this Article except for the Pre-class Period.  The 
Pre-class Period was the base group in the regressions so that the coef-
ficients on the time-period dummies reflect how the probability of 
sample defendants underperforming their peer groups changed (if at 
all) in post-litigation periods relative to the Pre-class Period.  For ex-
ample, under this model specification, a significant and positive coeffi-
cient for the dummy variable for Year 1 Post-lawsuit in the Market-to-
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Book ratio regression would suggest that, compared to the Pre-class 
Period, sample defendants were more likely to underperform their 
peers in terms of the Market-to-Book ratio one year after the class-
action filing. 
Second, we added a dummy variable for cases in which there was 
an SEC enforcement action.  This variable was assigned the value of 
“1” if there was a parallel SEC enforcement action against the defen-
dant and the observation was from a time period after the start of the 
lawsuit but before the settlement of the case, and “0” otherwise.  An 
SEC enforcement action is relevant to post-lawsuit observations be-
cause it lends support to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and en-
hances the likelihood that the dispute would be resolved in favor of 
the plaintiffs.  Our previous research has shown that settlement 
amounts are positively influenced by the presence of a parallel SEC 
enforcement action against the class-action defendant.71  The anticipa-
tion of a higher settlement amount may in turn affect the defendant’s 
fiscal policies, corporate morale, and operational efficiency, as well as 
the stock market’s response to the pending lawsuit. 
Third, we inserted a dummy variable for the presence of an insti-
tutional lead plaintiff in the securities class action.  We assigned a val-
ue of “1” to the variable if the lead plaintiff of the lawsuit was an insti-
tution rather than an individual (or a group of individuals), and 
studied the time period in between the filing of the lawsuit and set-
tlement.  Our prior research has shown that the presence of an insti-
tutional lead plaintiff is associated with larger settlements.72  There-
fore, the participation of an institution as the lead plaintiff may affect 
the anticipated outcome of the case, and that, again, could affect our 
measures of firm underperformance. 
Fourth, we put in a variable for the length of the class period.  
The length of the class period is a proxy for the period of fraud and is 
factored into the calculation of provable losses.  Provable losses bear 
strong influence to the settlement amount of the case and hence the 
anticipated financial consequence of the lawsuit on the defendant.73  
Naturally, the length of the class period is irrelevant for financial per-
formance and stock market return observations that are associated 
with time periods pre-filing and post-settlement.  For those observa-
tions, the length of class period variable received an entry of “0.” 
71 See Cox, Thomas & Bai, supra note 15, at 376 (noting strong positive correlation 
between the two). 
72 Id. at 378-79. 
73 Id. at 376-78. 
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Fifth, we added a dummy variable for the filing of financial restate-
ments that overlapped with the class period if the filing had occurred 
prior to the observation of financial metrics for any given time period 
between the filing of the lawsuit and the settlement of the case.  The fil-
ing of financial restatements may reflect that a material misrepresenta-
tion in the firm’s financial statements has occurred and thus provide 
support for the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.  This in turn may affect 
people’s anticipation of the outcome of the case and the resulting fi-
nancial burden on the defendant. 
Sixth, we included the ratio of provable loss to total assets for all 
observations relating to the time period after the filing of the lawsuit 
but before the settlement of the case.  Our prior research has shown 
that provable losses are an important determinant of the final settle-
ment amount of a securities class action:  higher provable losses typi-
cally lead to higher absolute settlement amounts.74  For this reason, 
provable losses are potentially a powerful predictor of the financial 
burdens to be imposed on the defendant by the class action and 
hence relevant to our measure of underperformance. 
Finally, we inserted a variable for the ratio of settlement amount 
to total assets, if the observation occurred after the settlement of the 
case.  The settlement amount affects our measure of defendants’ un-
derperformance because it translates directly into the scale of the fi-
nancial burden faced by the defendants in the post-settlement years.  
For example, defendants that were subject to the misfortune of a large 
settlement payment might experience tighter liquidity constraints, in-
creased difficulty in obtaining outside financing, and a more stressed 
stock market performance. 
2.  Regression Results 
Table 4 reports the regression results for sample defendants’ Asset 
Turnover ratio—the amount of sales that are generated from each 
dollar of assets—which measures the company’s efficiency at using its 
assets in generating sales or revenues.  As seen earlier in Section III.B, 
the summary statistics did not reveal any evidence of a reduction in 
defendant companies’ sales levels as a result of the securities class ac-
tions.  This conclusion is also supported by our multivariate regression 
after controlling for factors discussed in the model specifications. 
74 Id. 
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Table 4:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in Sales Turnover 
 
Parameter Coefficient 
Wald 
Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.66 23.22 <.0001 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit -0.17 0.42 0.52 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit -0.15 0.22 0.64 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit -0.16 0.14 0.71 
Year of Settlement -0.23 0.72 0.40 
Year 1 Post-settlement -0.35 2.32 0.13 
Year 2 Post-settlement -0.34 2.07 0.15 
Year 3 Post-settlement -0.44 2.48 0.12 
Parallel SEC Action -0.39 1.89 0.17 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff -0.32 1.77 0.18 
Length of Class Period 0.01 0.45 0.50 
Financial Restatement -0.49 3.02 0.08* 
Settlement/Total Assets 0.00 0.52 0.47 
Provable Loss/Total Assets -0.01 1.04 0.31 
* Significant at 10%.    
 
The coefficients on the time-period dummies and the control va-
riables are all insignificant, except for the dummy variable for the de-
fendant’s filing of financial restatements.75  This result suggests that 
the probability of defendants underperforming their peer groups did 
not change from the Pre-class Period level (i.e., the start of the securi-
ties class action) and its eventual settlement level.  The sales networks 
of sample defendants appear to be robust, contrary to the hypothesis 
that customers react to reports of financial chicanery by severing 
business relationships with those who have allegedly defrauded their 
own shareholders (as opposed to customers).  Thus, it appears that 
the anticipated and actual settlement amounts did not affect revenue 
activities, as indicated by the insignificance of the coefficients on the 
control variables, such as the parallel presence of an SEC enforcement 
75 Recall that a negative sign indicates that firms settling securities fraud class actions 
are less likely to underperform their peers; thus, we observe that the presence of a finan-
cial restatement makes it more likely that a firm will outperform its comparable compa-
nies.  This is a curious result for which we cannot provide a compelling interpretation. 
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action, the participation of institutions as the lead plaintiffs, the length 
of class periods, the provable loss, and actual settlement amounts. 
Table 5 reports the regression results for the EBIT/Total Assets 
ratio.  As discussed earlier, this ratio reflects a company’s operational 
efficiency.76  Bearing in mind the results of Table 4, which shows a 
general absence of any evidence of diminished sales revenues, the 
change in the EBIT/Total Assets ratio signifies changes in the com-
pany’s operating costs.  The summary statistics described earlier in this 
Article have shown that sample defendants manifested inferior 
EBIT/Total Asset ratios (higher operating costs) in the post-lawsuit 
and pre-settlement periods than in the Pre-class Period, and higher 
percentages of underperformance (relative to peer groups) through-
out most post-lawsuit periods, including the years after the settlement 
of the case.77  The decline in operating efficiency may well reflect the 
ongoing forces that caused management to falsely report the firm’s 
performance in the first place.  Also, revelation of the earlier false re-
porting introduces new forces that adversely impact the firm’s opera-
tions as the lawsuit diverts management’s attention, lowers company 
morale, tarnishes its stature, and deprives it of external financing op-
portunities, among other effects. 
The logit regression results in Table 5 confirm that sample defen-
dants’ operational efficiency deteriorates in the early years following 
the commencement of the lawsuit.  For the post-settlement periods, 
defendant firms with high settlement amounts had a higher probabili-
ty of underperforming their peer groups than companies facing lower 
settlement amounts.  This could be attributed to several factors.  First, 
the earlier, underreported financial problems are correlated with the 
ultimate settlement amount, so firms that ultimately incur large set-
tlements also are firms that experience greater operational challenges.  
Second, firms that incur larger settlements are firms whose defalca-
tions had a larger impact.  We would expect those firms to incur tigh-
ter financial constraints, diminished financing opportunities, or high-
er financing costs, and to suffer the resulting deprivation of capital 
needed to enhance operational efficiency.78 
76 See supra Section III.B (describing the significance of the parameters in this study). 
77 Id. 
78 We also ran a logit regression on the Return-on-Asset data.  The results are consis-
tent with the summary statistics described in earlier parts of this Article in that they do 
not suggest any significant change in the sample defendants’ overall profitability relative 
to their comparable companies in the post-lawsuit period.  We are not reporting the re-
gression results in a separate table because of space constraints and because the return-
on-asset ratio, while reflecting a company’s overall profitability, does not directly reveal 
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Table 5:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in EBIT/Total Assets 
 
Parameter Coefficient Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.34 6.41 0.01 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit 0.52 3.78 0.05** 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit 0.20 0.42 0.52 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit 0.81 3.10 0.08* 
Year of Settlement 0.02 0.01 0.94 
Year 1 Post-settlement -0.06 0.06 0.81 
Year 2 Post-settlement 0.09 0.13 0.72 
Year 3 Post-settlement 0.43 2.09 0.15 
Parallel SEC Action -0.09 0.09 0.76 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff -0.25 0.99 0.32 
Length of Class Period 0.00 0.18 0.67 
Financial Restatement -0.20 0.46 0.50 
Settlement/Total Assets  0.002 3.31 0.07* 
Provable Loss/Total Assets 0.01 0.62 0.43 
* Significant at 10%.    
** Significant at 5%.     
 
We were also concerned about changes in the liquidity level of 
defendant firms in securities class actions.  The earlier summary sta-
tistics reported a substantial increase in the percentage of sample de-
fendant firms that underperformed compared to their cohort in 
terms of the Current Ratio in years following the class actions’ settle-
ments.  We were not surprised by this result, because defendants’ in-
surance might not have provided full coverage for the settlement 
amount, in which case the firm would record the balance as a short-
term debt obligation to be paid out of cash or other liquid assets.  
The regression results, which are reported in Table 6, are consis-
tent with the summary statistics. 
 
the company’s profitability from core business operations since the ratio includes non-
operating items such as investments in other firms, taxes, and interest expenses. 
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Table 6:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in Current Ratio 
 
Parameter Coefficient Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.19 1.88 0.17 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit 0.18 0.45 0.50 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit -0.33 0.97 0.32 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit 0.17 0.16 0.69 
Year of Settlement 0.16 0.30 0.58 
Year 1 Post-settlement 0.40 2.64 0.10* 
Year 2 Post-settlement 0.58 5.02 0.03** 
Year 3 Post-settlement 0.26 0.81 0.37 
Parallel SEC Action 0.42 1.91 0.17 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff -0.23 0.76 0.38 
Length of Class Period 0.003 0.14 0.71 
Financial Restatement 0.23 0.53 0.47 
Settlement/Total Assets  0.002 4.73 0.03** 
Provable Loss/Total Assets 0.02 1.12 0.29 
* Significant at 10%.    
** Significant at 5%.  
 
The dummy variables for the pre-settlement periods were uniform-
ly insignificant, but the dummy variables for the two years immediately 
after the settlement were both positive and significant.  This suggests 
that sample defendants were more likely to experience lower liquidity 
levels than their peers in the post-settlement years than in the Pre-class 
Period.  Moreover, this probability increased with the settlement 
amount, as evidenced by the positive and higher significant coefficient 
for the ratio of the settlement amount to the firm’s total assets (Settle-
ment/Total Assets).  These numbers are consistent with the theory that 
insurance provided less than full coverage of the settlement amounts 
and that the defendants paid the discrepancy out of their current assets.  
The settlement payment exacerbated liquidity constraints, making the 
defendants more vulnerable to liquidity crunches and prone to bank-
ruptcy.  The numbers in Table 6 are inconsistent with an alternative 
hypothesis on causality that would suggest that the inferior post-
settlement performances of defendant firms were not caused by the li-
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quidity constraint of settlements, but rather were simply the results of 
progression along a course of decline that started in the years prior to 
the lawsuit.  Under this alternative hypothesis, we would expect to see 
more significant deterioration in pre-settlement periods than in post-
settlement periods, because the former were closer to the commission 
of fraud.  However, the numbers in Table 6 suggest the contrary. 
The Altman’s Z-score regression results reported in Table 7 below 
further support the theory of settlement-induced liquidity constraint. 
 
Table 7:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in Altman’s Z-score 
 
Parameter Coefficient 
Wald Chi-
Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.29 2.98 0.08 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit 0.29 0.98 0.32 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit 0.45 1.55 0.21 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit 0.54 1.30 0.25 
Year of Settlement 0.11 0.13 0.71 
Year 1 Post-settlement 0.57 4.47 0.03** 
Year 2 Post-settlement 0.87 9.24 0.002** 
Year 3 Post-settlement 0.89 7.71 0.006** 
Parallel SEC Action 0.28 0.69 0.41 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff 0.18 0.41 0.52 
Length of Class Period 0.01 0.52 0.47 
Financial Restatement 0.23 0.48 0.49 
Settlement/Total Assets  -0.0004 0.09 0.77 
Provable Loss/Total Assets 0.03 0.15 0.70 
** Significant at 5%.    
 
As mentioned earlier, the Altman’s Z-score reflects a company’s 
overall financial distress level; it is a measure that includes return on 
assets, the ratio of sales to total assets, the ratio of debt to equity, the 
ratio of working capital to total assets, and the ratio of retained earn-
ings to total assets.79  Earlier, we found that the Z-score parameter con-
firmed our expectation that class actions were financially stressful 
 79 See supra Section III.B. 
1908 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1877 
events for the defendant companies, given the uncertainty in outcome 
before settlement and the liquidity constraints imposed on defendants 
after settlement.80  The multivariate regression supports this conclu-
sion.  The coefficients were positive for each post-lawsuit period (indi-
cating a greater likelihood of underperformance by defendants on 
this measure), but only those for post-settlement periods were signifi-
cant at the 5% level, suggesting that sample defendant firms were 
more likely than their peers to have lower Z-scores in the post-
settlement periods.  Moreover, this increased likelihood was not mere-
ly present in defendants facing large settlement amounts, but was 
present across the sample of defendant firms.81 
We note that the coefficient on the settlement variable, while neg-
ative, is insignificant.  The standard interpretation of this result would 
be that settlement amounts do not affect the sample firms’ Altman’s 
Z-scores, or more generally, that settlement size is unrelated to the li-
kelihood the firm will file for bankruptcy.  This interpretation would 
lend further support to the hypothesis that defendant firms were sub-
ject to distress even prior to the lawsuit and that the lower Z-score was 
the result of a natural course of deterioration unrelated to the class 
action.  While this is a possible interpretation, we note a few pieces of 
evidence that are inconsistent with this interpretation and suggest that 
the lower Z-score was likely attributed to the liquidity constraints im-
posed by the settlement.  First, the post-lawsuit but pre-settlement pe-
riod coefficients in the regression are insignificant, while the post-
settlement coefficients are significant.  This result suggests that the 
payment of the settlement may have exacerbated the firms’ financial 
troubles.  Second, if the financial stress were simply a manifestation of 
a downward trajectory that started before the filing of the class action, 
we would also expect to see signs of deterioration in key operating pa-
rameters such as sales revenue and net income.  As discussed earlier, 
our data do not show these signs.  Third, the lower Market-to-Book ra-
tios in the post-settlement period for sample firms (which we report in 
Table 8) could also lower these firms’ Altman’s Z-score.  However, if 
the lower Z-score was attributable to a lower market value of equity, we 
should have seen significance for post-lawsuit, pre-settlement periods.  
Next, lower EBIT and/or lower sales could also lead to a lower Z-
80 Id. 
81 We should add that some firms that were initially dropped from our sample for 
lack of financial ratio information may have gone bankrupt after the lawsuit was filed.  
Their disappearance from our sample means that these results are conservative esti-
mates of the effect of settled lawsuits on the Altman’s Z-score measure. 
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score, but we have shown that the lower EBIT was limited to the post-
lawsuit, but pre-settlement, periods in Table 5, and that defendants’ 
sales revenues did not change in Table 4.  In addition, lower retained 
earnings could also lead to a lower Z-score, but we do not see changes 
in Return-on-Assets, and we have no reason to believe that defendants 
lower the plowback ratio only in post-settlement years and not in pre-
settlement years.  Finally, the only factor not listed above that affects a 
Z-score is the short-term liquidity, and we have shown in Table 6 that 
defendants had a significantly lower Current Ratio in post-settlement 
years, indicating an increase in liquidity constraints post-settlement.  
These factors combined suggest the lower-than-peer Z-score may be 
connected with settlement size.  Moreover, even though we are not 
seeing significance for the coefficient of the Settlement/Total Asset ra-
tio to the underperformance probability of defendant firms, the Pear-
son correlation82 of the settlement size and the value of the defendants’ 
Z-scores for post-settlement observations was negative and significant,83 
suggesting the Z-scores were lower for firms with large settlements. 
Our final inquiries focus on the stock price performance of sam-
ple defendant firms.  As we have discussed, the stock market is the 
primary channel through which shareholders (including plaintiffs in 
securities class actions) receive compensation for their investments.84  
In the long run, the market does not reward lying; previous research 
documents a negative stock market response to news of securities class 
actions.85  If this negative response persists for an extended period of 
time, even after the conclusion of the case (i.e., the settlement), the 
value to shareholders from bringing the class action and extracting 
large settlement payments should be offset by their losses in the stock 
market.  Our earlier summary statistics reported persistently inferior 
Market-to-Book ratio for sample defendants throughout the entire post-
lawsuit and post-settlement periods.86  We now use a multivariate regres-
sion to examine whether this result was robust after controlling for other 
82 The correlation between two variables is a number between -1 and +1 that 
measures the degree to which the variables are related.  The Pearson correlation is the 
most common measure of such a relationship.  It is obtained by dividing the cova-
riance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviations.  For more dis-
cussion of the Pearson correlation, see ALLEN L. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LI-
NEAR REGRESSION AND CORRELATION 33-46 (1976). 
83 The Pearson correlation was -0.18, and the p -value was 0.004. 
84 See supra Section III.B. 
85 See supra note 30. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68. 
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factors that might also be driving the variations in the summary statistics.  
The regression results are reported in Table 8 below. 
 
Table 8:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
Parameter Coefficient Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -0.64 17.30 <.0001 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit 0.65 5.24 0.02** 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit 0.61 2.96 0.09* 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit 0.59 1.64 0.20 
Year of Settlement 0.29 0.99 0.32 
Year 1 Post-settlement 0.85 11.36 0.001** 
Year 2 Post-settlement 1.01 14.53 0.0001** 
Year 3 Post-settlement 0.82 7.32 0.01** 
Parallel SEC Action -0.23 0.51 0.48 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff 0.60 5.21 0.02** 
Length of Class Period 0.001 0.02 0.90 
Financial Restatement 0.57 3.04 0.08* 
Settlement/Total Assets  0.001 1.43 0.23 
Provable Loss/Total Assets 0.02 0.15 0.70 
* Significant at 10%.    
** Significant at 5%.  
 
The persistence of the pressure on defendants’ stock prices is 
striking and statistically significant.  The coefficients on the time-
period dummies were positive and highly significant, not only during 
the first two years after the start of the class action, but also into each 
of the three years after the settlement of the case.  This result means 
that sample defendants were more likely to have lower Market-to-Book 
ratios than their peers in the post-lawsuit periods than in the Pre-class 
Period.  Market price plummeted immediately after the start of the 
lawsuit and did not recover even three years after the conclusion of 
the case.  The positive and significant coefficients on the institutional-
lead-plaintiff dummy and the financial-restatement dummy were not 
surprising, because these factors typically correspond to higher set-
tlement amounts that defendants must pay. 
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We also performed a logit regression to show any change in the li-
kelihood of sample defendants underperforming their comparable 
companies in One-Year Stock Returns before, during, and after the 
conclusion of the securities class action.  Table 9 reports the results.  
Persistent deteriorations in annual returns suggest a continued price 
decline, while superior positive returns suggest price recovery. 
 
Table 9:  Logit Regression:  Sample Defendants 
Underperforming in One-Year Stock Return 
 
Parameter Coefficient Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.76 22.18 <.0001 
Year 1 Post-lawsuit 0.51 3.64 0.06* 
Year 2 Post-lawsuit -0.10 0.12 0.73 
Year 3 Post-lawsuit -0.14 0.17 0.68 
Year 1 Post-settlement 0.28 1.08 0.30 
Year 2 Post-settlement 0.05 0.04 0.85 
Year 3 Post-settlement -0.20 0.53 0.47 
Parallel SEC Action 0.20 0.82 0.37 
Institutional Lead Plaintiff -0.03 0.02 0.89 
Length of Class Period -0.01 1.07 0.30 
Financial Restatement 
(Nonclass Period) -0.23 0.47 0.49 
Financial Restatement 
(Class Period) 0.43 1.30 0.25 
Settlement/Total Assets  0.85 0.30 0.58 
Provable Loss/Total Assets -0.05 1.12 0.29 
* Significant at 10%.    
 
Consistent with the summary statistics, the coefficients on the 
time-period dummies were mostly insignificant, except for Year 1 Post-
lawsuit, which suggests that sample defendant firms’ relative stock 
market performance deteriorated from the Pre-class Period level in 
the year immediately after the lawsuit was filed, but remained stable 
thereafter.87  The stable Stock Returns after the first year of the lawsuit 
87 We also ran an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to see if the one-year 
returns of the defendants (as opposed to their performance compared to their peers) 
changed before, during, and after the completion of class actions, using the returns of 
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and the persistently low Market-to-Book ratios jointly suggest that the 
initiation of securities class actions had an instantaneous negative im-
pact on stock prices, but that the impact was mostly absorbed within 
the first year of the lawsuit.  Prices were stable afterwards but re-
mained at low levels until years after the settlement of the lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we observe several important results. Defendant 
firms that settle securities class actions experience no significant de-
clines in sales opportunities as a result of the lawsuit and settlement, 
but do undergo a reduced level of operating efficiency while the law-
suit was pending (but not after it is settled).  Most significantly, we also 
observe that, after settlement, defendant firms experience liquidity 
problems, as well as worsening Altman’s Z-scores.88  Here, the distinc-
tion between causation and correlation is important.  For example, do 
our findings regarding the deterioration of the Altman’s Z-scores sug-
gest that settlements drive firms toward financial distress (i.e., settle-
ments are causally related to the worsening situation), or do they sug-
gest that the financial deterioration in earlier time periods continues 
downward regardless of the settlement or its size (i.e., settlements are 
merely correlated with weakening financial performance), or do they 
represent some combination of both?  To be sure, there is great intui-
tive appeal to the view that settlement payments exacerbated liquidity 
constraints on the defendants and enhanced their vulnerability to fi-
nancial distress in post-settlement years. 
In a sense, there is something in our results for both sides of the 
debate over the effects of securities litigation.  One side could point to-
ward our findings as evidence that the litigation is not a zero-sum game 
for wrongdoers in which only the insurer pays.  If litigation were such a 
zero-sum game, we would not find suggestions that settlements are as-
sociated with weakening Altman’s Z-scores.  On the other hand, others 
could claim that settlements, if not the entire litigation process, are a 
menace because they drain funds from the corporation that could bet-
ter be directed towards strengthening its financial position.  Somewhat 
comparable companies as a control variable on the right-hand side.  The OLS results 
also suggest that the one-year return deteriorated in the year immediately after the 
start of the lawsuit but remained stable thereafter.  To conserve space, we are not re-
porting the OLS results here. 
88 These findings are reinforced by the fact that forty-three of the 480 firms in our 
sample filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
2010] Lying and Getting Caught 1913 
counter to this view, however, is our finding that settlement size has a 
significant effect on the observed decline of the Current Ratio. 
While we will continue to build on the findings we present, prob-
ing further into the relationship between settlements and the increas-
ing financial distress we observed for firms involved in securities class 
action, we believe there are some immediate, albeit tentative, sugges-
tions from our findings for the future conduct of private securities lit-
igation.  Although uncertainty persists about the precise connection 
between settlements and financial distress, there is no uncertainty that 
firms involved in securities class action litigation experience statistically 
greater risks of financial distress than their cohort firms.  Since the 
burdens of ongoing embroilment in securities class action contribute 
to the firm experiencing value-decreasing pressures, our findings lend 
strong support for the view that such suits are better directed toward 
the officers, advisors, and other individuals who bear responsibility for 
the fraudulent representation(s) that spawned the suit.89  Suits so di-
rected do not pose the same burdens on the subject corporation as do 
suits whose prosecution and ultimate settlement are focused on the 
corporation itself.  Moreover, the rising levels of compensation gar-
nered by firm executives in the past two decades suggest that today—
more so than, say, a quarter century ago—suits targeting only executives 
who are responsible for the fraud yield a financial target worthy of even 
the most avaricious class of plaintiffs and their attorneys.  This approach 
is supported further by our findings that a firm targeted in a securities 
class action incurs a substantial market penalty with significant declines 
in the value of its shares.  We observe that the negative return associated 
with the filing of the suit is not recovered in later years.  Thus, we might 
well believe that further embroilment in the litigation unnecessarily pe-
nalizes companies and inhibits the suit from pursuing those most re-
sponsible for the fraud endured by investors. 
Though our findings support a greater role for individual (as op-
posed to entity) liability for securities fraud, this proposed shift in fo-
cus of private suits faces strong doctrinal headwinds.  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has narrowed the scope of liability in securities fraud 
litigation.  In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the 
Supreme Court reversed decades of precedent imposing aiding-and-
89 See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 
3, 26 (1999) (proposing the imposition of liability on individuals responsible for the 
fraudulent practices, a practice which would affirm societal values that underlie the 
violated norms, such as truthfulness, so that future compliance by others is enhanced). 
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abetting liability under Rule 10b-5,90 and later, in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court absolved “remote” 
participants in a scheme to defraud investors.91  The Supreme Court’s 
narrow view of who is subject to primary liability under the SEC’s anti-
fraud provision has prompted the lower courts to repeatedly reach re-
sults at odds with imposing just deserts on violators.  For example, 
Pugh v. Tribune Co. found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stone-
ridge insulated from liability a senior executive who had inflated his 
subsidiary’s revenues and income.92  In the wake of such decisions, the 
focus on entity liability is likely to continue, and just deserts are likely 
to remain an unfulfilled public policy objective founded on data such 
as what we have presented here. 
More broadly, our findings tell an interesting story not only about 
the possible motivations for lying but also about the implications of 
being caught cheating.  While a weakening in the firm’s sales revenues 
does not appear to motivate false financial reporting, the inability to 
maintain desirable levels of performance in other areas may lead 
managers to fib.  Poor management or a deteriorating operating envi-
ronment pressures managers to falsely paint a different picture of the 
true situation for the public.  In the end, truth does prevail, the man-
agers’ chicanery is detected, and the adverse winds that drove them 
into the troubled waters do not abate.  The remaining question is 
whether the litigation and settlement caused those winds to quicken. 
 
90 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
91 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). 
92 521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2008).  See also, e.g., In re Nature’s Sunshine Prods. 
Sec. Litig., No. 06-0267, 2008 WL 4442150 (D. Utah Sept. 23, 2008) (declining to find 
liability under Rule 10b-5 for a CEO who falsely represented facts to the firm’s auditor 
in order to obtain an unqualified audit opinion).
